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 In order to begin a treatment of the articulation of Christian hope within the 
liberation theology of Jon Sobrino, it will be helpful to examine briefly the context 
out of which liberation theology arises and which shapes its approach to the 
question, “hope for whom?”.  The development of Latin American liberation 
theology finds significant roots both in German political theology and in the 
reception and implementation of the documents of the Second Vatican Council by 
the Latin American Bishops’ conferences at Medellín (1968) and at Puebla (1979).  
German political theology developed largely by Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgen 
Moltmann rejects the separation of theology and the world and, therefore, sets as 
its task theological reflection on and critique of the contemporary political world.1  
By engaging in this task, political theology provided liberation theologians with 
“new categories of religious language, introducing distinctively political concepts 
such as liberation…and oppression.”2 It also grounded the theological language of 
salvation and hope in concrete historical conditions,3 which enabled liberation 
theologians to articulate salvation and hope in terms of the particular conditions of 
the poor and the oppressed in Latin America. 
 The transformative effect of Vatican II within Latin American countries 
facilitated by the synods of bishops at Medellín and Puebla as well as by Pope Paul 
VI’s encyclical Populorum progressio provided perhaps the most immediate 
context for the development of liberation theology.  Vatican II’s urging of the 
Church to be attentive to the ‘signs of the times’, its articulation of the task of 
                                                 
1 Rebecca Chopp, The Praxis of Suffering: An Interpretation of Liberation and Political Theologies (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis Books, 1986), p. 19, 101. 
2 Ibid., p. 20. 
3 Ibid. 
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evangelization as bringing “deliverance to the human conditions, to cultures, [and] 
to social and familial relationships”, and its understanding of the Church as servant 
of the world found creative reception and rearticulation within the Latin American 
synods.4  In the context of the Latin America church, the conferences at Medellín 
and Puebla understood the ‘signs of the times’ as “social injustices and forms of 
dehumanization”, they interpreted evangelization as “efforts to liberate and 
humanize the peoples”, and they saw the servant Church as characterized by its 
service to the poor and the oppressed.5  Liberation theology emerged out of the 
synods’ interpretations of these themes as Segundo Galilea notes: “[T]he Medellín 
Conference may be regarded as the point of departure for this theology [of 
liberation].”6   
 Liberation theology’s treatment of Christian hope must be understood within 
this context as an articulation of hope for the poor and the oppressed.  Thus, hope 
within liberation theology is a particular and historical hope, that is, it is particular 
to the poor and the oppressed and it is primarily a hope for liberation within 
history.  Gustavo Gutierrez clearly understood this particularity of the kingdom for 
the poor as compatible with the kingdom’s basic inclusion of all people.7  Sobrino, 
however, claims that Christian hope is a “partial hope” for the poor and the 
oppressed8 and this assertion seems to go a step beyond the articulation of a 
particular hope and beyond the Medellín and Puebla interpretations of Vatican II.  
My treatment of the question “hope for whom?” in this paper primarily raises a 
critical question about the exclusivity implied by Sobrino’s understanding of the 
partiality of Christian hope.  In critiquing Sobrino’s understanding of hope, it is not 
my intention to deny the unique and particular place that the poor and the 
oppressed have in the Kingdom of God.  Nor is it my intention to lessen or excuse 
the responsibility of the rich as the oppressors of the poor.  Rather, because I wish 
to uphold and protect the unique and particular claim that the poor and the 
oppressed have on kingdom and resurrection hope, I question Sobrino’s assertion 
of partiality which seems to oppose or at least make secondary the kingdom’s 
fundamental universality.  
I begin my discussion of the question “hope for whom?” by critically 
searching for an answer to this question within the christologies of Jürgen 
                                                 
4 Segundo Galilea, “Latin America in the Medellín and Puebla Conferences: An Example of Selective and Creative 
Reception of Vatican II” found in The Reception of Vatican II (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1987), 
ed. by Giuseppe Alberigo, Jean-Pierre Jossua, and Joseph Komonchak, p. 63-65. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 65.   
7 Gustavo Gutierrez, “The Church and the Poor: A Latin American Perspective” found in The Reception of Vatican 
II (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1987), ed. by Giuseppe Alberigo, Jean-Pierre Jossua, and Joseph 
Komonchak, p. 179. 
8 Jon Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), p. 124. 
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Moltmann and Edward Schillebeeckx.  These two theologians provide 
understandings of the universality of Christian hope which also emphasize the 
particularity of this hope for the poor and the oppressed.  That is, their theologies 
attempt to hold in balance universality and particularity.  By beginning with 
Moltmann and Schillebeeckx, I hope to make my critique of Sobrino’s assertion of 
partiality more precise and offer a correction to Sobrino’s approach rather than 
suggesting its rejection. 
For Moltmann, Schillebeeckx and Sobrino, the proclamation of the kingdom 
of God through Jesus constitutes the basis for shaping their understanding of 
Christian hope.  Yet, each of these theologians assumes a different starting point 
and presents varying themes of emphasis in approaching the three linked and 
interrelated segments of this proclamation, which are Jesus’ life, death and 
resurrection.   
Still, in spite of the differences in their approaches, the central issue of the 
universality and particularity or partiality of kingdom hope emerges in each of 
their christologies.  A consideration of the particularity or partiality of Christian 
hope pushes us to seek specific answers to the question “hope for whom?” within 
each of these theologians’ perspectives.  It raises the more specific questions: Who 
in particular can hope that Jesus is “on their side” and whose cause does he take up 
in his life, death and resurrection?  Does Jesus take up the cause of humanity, the 
cause of sinners, or the cause of victims?  In what sense is the hope to be included 
in the kingdom of God a universal hope and in what sense is it a particular hope?  
In comparing Moltmann, Schillebeeckx and Sobrino on their treatments of these 
questions the issue of the inclusivity or exclusivity of the kingdom and Christian 
hope rises to the surface.  Sobrino’s liberation theology presents a narrower picture 
of who can hope to be included in the kingdom than do the theologies of Moltmann 
and Schillebeeckx.  Their broader perspectives assert that the fundamental 
universality and inclusivity of the kingdom is the necessary precondition for its 
inclusion of any particular person or group of people.   
In moving forward with this analysis, I first define an understanding of the 
content of Christian hope, that is, I address the question “hope for what?”.  Then I 
turn to the question “hope for whom?” by exploring this question within each of 
the christologies of Moltmann, Schillebeeckx and Sobrino.  In my treatment of 
each of these theologians, I look at his interpretation of the kingdom as made 
manifest in Jesus’ life, death and resurrection.  I conclude each treatment with a 
brief analysis of the theologian’s understanding of the universality and particularity 
of kingdom hope.  Finally, I close this discussion by comparatively assessing their 
basic claims about the universality, particularity and partiality of Christian hope. 
Before I turn my to the question “hope for whom?”, it will be helpful for me 
to briefly specify a basic and mediating answer to the question “hope for what?”.  
  4 
For the purpose of my discussion here, I understand Christian hope as essentially 
consisting of two parts.  First, it is a hope for salvation and eternal life – for a 
lasting place in the fully realized reign of God, which is still to come.  Secondly, 
Christian hope is a hope for liberation within history.  It is a hope to be free from 
the oppressing power of shame and guilt as well as from economic, social and 
political oppressors.  This understanding of Christian hope is often referred to as 
hope for ‘integral salvation’.  It is this understanding of hope as hope for integral 
salvation that I carry forward into my investigation of the question “hope for 
whom?”.  I begin this investigation with the christology of Jürgen Moltmann.  
 
 Moltmann’s christology begins with the suffering of God in Jesus’ death on 
the cross, which he calls the “death in God” because he asserts that through Jesus’ 
death suffering entered into God himself.  Thus, on the cross, God reveals himself 
as a ‘moved mover’ who suffers with humanity.  In order to explore the question 
“hope for whom?” in this context, we will have to ask the questions: (1) for whom 
did Jesus suffer and die? And (2) who can identify with Jesus’ suffering and death?  
In understanding the “for whom?” in Jesus’ death, we will clarify Moltmann’s 
view of the “for whom?” of resurrection and kingdom hope.   
 Moltmann explores Jesus’ suffering and death through an examination of 
three trials each of which hands down a particular judgment upon Jesus.  First, 
Jesus is condemned as a blasphemer for teaching with an authority “above the 
authority of Moses and the Torah.”9  This makes Jesus guilty of the “blasphemy of 
self-deification.”10  By preaching the reign of God as the justification of sinners by 
grace and not as judgment, Jesus undermines the law, deceives sinners and 
blasphemes the God of hope.11  The second trial is the political trial before Pilate.  
In order to be sentenced to crucifixion, Jesus had to be misrepresented as a rebel.  
Moltmann claims that the political dimension of Jesus’ gospel, which had some 
similarities to the political aims of the Zealots, was misconstrued to have Jesus 
crucified as a rebel.12  Thus, He was a victim of misunderstanding. 
 Finally, Jesus underwent a trial before God which resulted in his rejection by 
the Father.  In the end, Jesus died godforsaken.  Jesus’ death on the cross was an 
experience of profound abandonment in which the Father to whom he felt so 
intimately close throughout his life remained silent at the time of his greatest need.  
Moltmann argues that Jesus ultimately did not die because of the religious leaders’ 
understanding of the law, or the political power of Pilate, but rather he died 
                                                 
9 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974), p. 128. 
10 Ibid., p. 129. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Moltmann, p. 144. 
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because of the silence of the Father.13  Jesus’ words on the cross in Mark 15:34, 
“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” expressed the suffering of Jesus 
crying out to his Father and claiming the Father’s unique faithfulness to himself.14  
Thus, Jesus felt God’s silence as his personal abandonment by the Father.  This is 
the height of his suffering and the cause of his death.  Simultaneously, the Father 
experiences the loss of his Son and suffers along with him.  On the cross, God, in 
the persons of Father and Son, experiences suffering.   
 The hope brought about by the resurrection can only be understood from 
Moltmann’s perspective if we understand Jesus as not just any man raised from the 
dead, but as one condemned and crucified by the oppressors of his people as a 
blasphemer and a rebel, and ultimately as one abandoned by God, his Father.15  He 
died as a misunderstood, misrepresented and abandoned victim, so his death raises 
the question of the triumph of executioners over their victims.  The resurrection of 
this victim proclaims that executioners will not triumph over victims, nor will 
victims triumph over their executioners, but rather Jesus who died for both victims 
and executioners will triumph.16  The hope of the resurrection then is a hope for the 
falsely condemned and crucified, the godforsaken, the victim and the executioner.  
According to Moltmann, the resurrection brings to the world “the new 
righteousness,” which “creates right both for the lawless and those outside the 
law.”17  Thus, both the lawless oppressors and the victims excluded by the law are 
offered hope within the new law inaugurated in the resurrection.   
 Yet to understand more clearly the “for whom?” of the resurrection, we need 
to say more about Jesus’ suffering and death.  On the cross, Jesus not only 
experiences abandonment by the Father, but in the humiliation of that 
abandonment, Jesus comes to the fullness of his humanity by sharing in the depths 
of human suffering.  Thus, “[t]he incarnation of the Logos is completed on the 
cross.”18  In Jesus’ humiliation and dehumanization, his becoming human is 
completed.  Moltmann seems to claim that in becoming “the kind of man we do 
not want to be: an outcast, accursed, crucified,”19 and in identifying with the least 
of humanity, Jesus becomes fully human and thus becomes one with all of 
humanity.  Because Jesus’ suffering becomes the Father’s suffering, the Father too 
demonstrates his willingness to identify with and suffer out of love for humanity.  
Moltmann argues that God’s true identity is revealed on the cross.  Here, the truth 
of God is revealed in his humiliation, helplessness, self-surrender and humanity 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 149. 
14 Ibid., p. 150. 
15 Ibid., p. 175. 
16 Moltmann, p. 178. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 204-5. 
19 Ibid., p. 205. 
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because “[h]ere he himself is love with all his being.”20  On the cross, God reveals 
himself as the God of freedom21 who respects human freedom and then unites 
himself with the human suffering which results from that freedom. 
 In this context of understanding the cross as the completion of the 
Incarnation and the disclosure of God’s true identity, the question “for whom?” 
finds its clearest answer.  In embracing complete self-humiliation and becoming 
fully human, God extends himself to all humanity without reservation: “He lowers 
himself and accepts the whole of mankind without limits and conditions, so that 
each man may participate in him with the whole of his life.”22  For Moltmann, 
Jesus’ full humanity on the cross indicates that each individual can equally claim 
participation in his divinity.  Moltmann does not see the distinctions between kinds 
of sinners that we will later see Sobrino finds.  Rather, he argues that Jesus came to 
justify sinners by grace without distinction “whether they are Zealots or tax 
collectors, Pharisees or sinners, Jews or Samaritans, and therefore, also, whether 
they are Jews or Gentiles.”23 Moltmann asserts this claim even more forcefully 
when he calls attention to the fact that the place of Jesus’ death, Golgotha, is 
outside Jerusalem at the boundary of society, where there are no distinctions 
among people. 
It [Jesus’ crucifixion] happened, in fact, on the boundary of human society, 
where it does not matter whether a person is Jew or Gentile, Greek or 
barbarian, master or servant, man or woman, because death is unaware of 
these distinctions.  So the crucified one does not recognize these distinctions 
either.24 
 
One could add rich or poor, oppressors or oppressed, righteous or sinners to this 
list.  “The ‘crucified’ God is the human God of all godless men and those who 
have been abandoned by God.”25  Those who are inhumane (oppressors) and those 
treated inhumanely (the oppressed) are recognized equally by Jesus on the cross.  
Thus, although Motlmann does see Jesus’ death as the unjust death of a victim of 
misunderstanding, he does not subsequently see participation in and redemption 
through his death as belonging partially or primarily to victims.  Instead, 
Moltmann argues that it is precisely in his death that Jesus identifies himself with 
the whole of humanity and all sinners without distinction.   
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, p. 195.  
22 Moltmann, p. 276. 
23 Ibid., p. 142. 
24 Ibid., p. 194. 
25 Ibid., p. 195. 
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Because the resurrection can only be appropriately understood as “the 
resurrection of the crucified Christ,”26 the hope of the resurrection has to be as 
inclusive, or as lacking in distinction, as Christ’s death.  Thus, for Moltmann, hope 
of the resurrection is a universal hope by its very nature.  Yet, in spite of its 
universality, hope of the resurrection particularly includes each individual in every 
position, inside or outside the boundaries of society.  We could say that this hope is 
universally particular, that is, it is particular to all sinners, or all humanity.  
Because, through Jesus’ death and experience of abandonment, God allows 
suffering to enter into himself, he does identify particularly with those who suffer.  
Yet, this identification with those who suffer destroys old distinctions between the 
godforsaken and the godless and it does not negate the fundamental universality of 
resurrection hope.  The resurrection of the crucified Christ institutes the kingdom 
of God: “Thus resurrection…is already itself the new creation.”27  In this new 
creation, the righteousness of God is revealed “as grace which makes righteous and 
as the creator’s love of the godless.”28  Moltmann clarifies further that the grace of 
the kingdom “makes both lawbreaker and lawless righteous.”29  Thus, the kingdom 
of God, the new creation, the new righteousness, does not make distinctions, but 
rather extends itself to all humanity in the resurrection of Christ, the condemned, 
crucified and abandoned Son of God.    
Edward Schillebeeckx interprets the relationship between Jesus and the 
Father on the cross differently than Moltmann, which leads him to a slightly 
different understanding of kingdom and resurrection hope.  Schillebeeckx argues 
that, although Moltmann correctly understands the cross as a demonstration of 
God’s desire and choice to suffer with suffering humanity, nevertheless he 
incorrectly places the blame for Jesus’ death on God’s silence rather than on 
human injustice.30  Schillebeeckx characterizes Jesus’ death not as an experience of 
abandonment and godforsakenness, like Moltmann, but as a personal experience of 
profound failure.31  As Jesus approaches his death, he experiences the rejection of 
his preaching of the reign of God and, thus, he experiences the apparent failure of 
his entire life’s work and mission.  In the face of this failure, Jesus experiences 
God’s hiddenness and silence.   However, God’s hiddenness does not lead Jesus to 
feelings of abandonment but rather pushes Jesus to continue trusting in his Father’s 
presence even though he appears to be absent.  This expression of trust in the 
hidden God during a real experience of failure creates the ground for hope.   
                                                 
26 Moltmann, p. 204. 
27 Ibid., p. 176. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 140. 
30 Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1981), p. 728. 
31 Ibid., p. 825. 
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Only if Jesus really experienced failure in a limited but real dimension of our 
history…can his own experience of failure as a historical event provide any 
encouragement, productive or critical force towards helping men to cope 
with the problem of failure.32 
 
It is precisely in the face of this failure that the true nature of God’s power is 
revealed.  The revelation of God’s power turns on its head our concept of power 
because it is the power of defenselessness which disarms evil.33  It is a “gratuitous 
action” which gains victory over the historical and empirical facts by choosing to 
stand vulnerable before them.34  Thus, Jesus’ faithfulness and trust in the midst of a 
real experience of failure in history demonstrates hope in something deeper and 
more powerful than the facts, namely, “the Lord of history.”35  This hope is a hope 
for personal validation through communion and relationship with God which will 
be unchanged by experiences of failure and the facts of history.  This is the essence 
of Christian hope for Schillebeeckx.   
Yet, Schillebeeckx asserts that resurrection hope is nothing more than 
“human longing” and Jesus’ death is “sheer failure” if there are not signs of the 
resurrection within Jesus’ life of preaching the kingdom.36   Jesus’ praxis of the 
kingdom anticipates his resurrection.37   Hope of the resurrection then is closely 
associated with and grounded in the hope of the kingdom.  Thus, for Schillebeeckx 
understanding Jesus’ praxis of the kingdom is necessary for understanding the “for 
whom?” of resurrection hope. 
 Schillebeeckx defines the kingdom of God in terms of Jesus’ association 
with the sick, the marginalized, tax collectors and sinners, the poor, “and finally in 
terms of all the oppressed.”38  Jesus’ practice of table fellowship and his protection 
of the children thought to be a burden by the disciples demonstrates the “for 
whom?” of the kingdom, according to Schillebeeckx.  The reign of God seeks out 
the outcasts, the poor and those like children.  Schillebeeckx asserts that the poor 
in the New Testament refer to those that are “really socially and economically 
poor, exploited and oppressed.”39  Thus, as we will see shortly, he appears to be in 
agreement with Sobrino’s classifications of the economic and sociologically poor.   
The difference between Schillebeeckx and Sobrino will be seen in each of 
their understandings of what the kingdom brings to these poor.  Schillebeeckx 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 824. 
33 Edward Schillebeeckx, Church: The Human Story of God (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1990), p. 90. 
34 Ibid., p. 95. 
35 Schillebeeckx, Christ, p. 831. 
36 Schillebeeckx, Church, p. 127. 
37 Praxis here means action and demonstration based on continued reflection and prayer.   
38 Ibid., p. 112. 
39 Ibid., p. 113. 
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acknowledges that liberation occurs within a cultural context and, therefore, 
“includes the recognition of systematic disruptions of communication like sexism, 
racism…and the Western cultural and religious sense of superiority.”40  Yet, for 
Schillebeeckx, the kingdom of God does not mean “direct liberation from poverty, 
exploitation and oppression,” but rather it means rescuing “the poor from their 
sense of shame at being outcast.”41  Freedom from shame is more basic and more 
difficult to achieve than freedom from economic and social oppression because it 
requires the direct intervention of God whereas the latter can be healed through 
human intervention.42  Thus, Christian hope for liberation within history begins 
with and consists primarily of liberation from sin and shame rather than from 
poverty and economic and social oppression.   
Although Schillebeeckx emphasizes the kingdom of God as a kingdom for 
the poor, this emphasis is rooted in a broader understanding of the kingdom: “The 
kingdom of God is a ‘kingdom of men and women’, a human kingdom.”43  It is 
because the kingdom is a human kingdom that it “takes concrete form above all in 
justice and peaceful relationships among individuals and peoples.”44  The poor and 
the oppressed have special significance in the realization of the kingdom because 
in their exclusion as outcasts the fullness of humanity is denied and undermined.  
Thus, the kingdom of God comes with the “abolition of the blatant contrast 
between rulers and ruled” and the elimination of social distinctions.45   
But, how are these distinctions to be abolished and how much depends on 
human vs. divine intervention?  Here, Jesus’ response to his experience of failure 
as he approaches death provides a model.  Jesus spent his life proclaiming and 
building the kingdom by drawing close to outcasts and sinners and challenging the 
rich and the powerful. Yet, in the face of death, Jesus’ mission seems to have 
failed.  However, in choosing to accept suffering and death with trust in God in 
spite of his hiddenness, Jesus allows God to achieve a victory which is greater than 
the historical and empirical facts of the rejection of his mission in the crucifixion.  
Thus, Jesus’ example suggests that the elimination of distinction and division in 
society comes through human initiative toward the loving inclusion of sinners and 
outcasts.  Yet, at the same time, individuals must respond to the failure, which will 
inevitably accompany this initiative, by continuing to trust in the God who is often 
hidden and silent.  Liberation within history through the abolition of social 
divisions, therefore, requires human praxis carried out with loving trust in the 
Father, but that praxis is not rendered ineffective by human failure because the 
                                                 
40 Schillebeeckx, Church, p. 132. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Schillebeeckx, Christ, p. 833. 
43 Schillebeeckx, Church, p. 112. 
44 Ibid., p. 111-2. 
45 Ibid., p. 112. 
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‘Lord of history’ holds the final say even in the face of failure, injustice and death.  
As Schillebeeckx says, “God’s transcendent overcoming of human failure is 
historically incorporated in Jesus’ never-ceasing love for God and man, during and 
in the historical moment of his failure on the cross.”46  Jesus’ trust in the Father 
during his real experience of failure on the cross was a definitive success which 
made God’s overcoming of human failure a historical reality.   
On the cross, Jesus illustrates the “positive link between the ‘kingdom of 
God’ and the ‘kingdom of human freedom’.”47  God’s overcoming of human 
failure does not involve a removal of human experiences of failure, which naturally 
accompany human freedom.  God’s kingdom does not enact its authority through 
force or oppression, which would violate human freedom.  Rather, God’s power 
manifests itself in defenselessness, vulnerability and love, which respect and 
enable human freedom.  Schillebeeckx asserts that the connection between the 
kingdom of God and the kingdom of human freedom is inherent in creation 
because in creation God assents to “a sort of ‘divine yielding’, making room for the 
other.”48  And “[b]y giving creative space to human beings, God makes himself 
vulnerable.”49  On the cross, Jesus demonstrates the love of God which leaves 
room for human freedom while at the same time overcoming human failure by 
disarming evil with defenselessness.  God’s recurring action in history to eliminate 
divisions and distinctions continues to demonstrate the positive link between the 
kingdom of God and the kingdom of human freedom.   
 Schillebeeckx’s caution against a condemnation of the rich and the 
oppressors, when seeking a means to abolish the division between rulers and ruled, 
rich and poor, reflects this understanding of the relationship between the kingdom 
of God and human freedom.  He argues that humanity is redeemed despite Jesus’ 
death on the cross and this redemption despite his death has to be understood in 
terms of “the refusal of Jesus to look for a culprit.”50  It does not facilitate the 
kingdom to make a culprit out of this or that person or group of people even if they 
have failed to live up to the love of the kingdom.  Looking for a culprit violates the 
kingdom of God because it encroaches on human freedom.  God’s respect for 
human freedom requires leaving room for and remaining open to the rich and the 
oppressors.  Making them into culprits falls short of this openness.  Jesus 
demonstrates the kingdom by associating particularly with the poor and outcasts, 
while at the same time respecting human freedom by refusing to exclude the rich 
and the oppressors in labeling them as culprits.    
                                                 
46 Schillebeeckx, Christ, p. 830. 
47 Schillebeeckx, Church, p. 88. 
48 Ibid., p. 90. 
49 Schillebeeckx, Church, p. 90. 
50 Schillebeeckx, Christ, p. 730. 
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Thus, for Schillebeeckx, the kingdom is particularly for the poor precisely 
because it is a universal, human kingdom.  The universality of the kingdom is the 
necessary precondition for its particularity.  We further the kingdom by 
emphasizing its particularity for those who are being excluded while at the same 
time maintaining its universality in refusing to exclude those who are doing the 
excluding.  Any understanding of the particularity of the kingdom for the poor that 
does not arise out of its fundamental and constant universality violates human 
freedom and, therefore, misinterprets the kingdom.   
Coming from the viewpoint of the Third World in El Salvador, Sobrino 
brings the experiences of the poor and the oppressed into his interpretation of the 
kingdom.  He sees the kingdom of God proclaimed and made manifest by Jesus as 
especially the kingdom for the poor.51  Borrowing from Moltmann, Sobrino 
understands the death of Jesus on the cross as the ‘crucified God.’52  However, he 
goes beyond Moltmann by interpreting the death of Jesus, a condemned, crucified, 
and abandoned victim, as an indication of God’s partiality toward victims.  This 
understanding of Jesus’ death along with his understanding of Jesus’ ministry as 
directed specifically toward the poor and those oppressed by society allow him to 
approach the resurrection from the view of the victims and thus to interpret 
Christian hope as primarily the “hope of victims.”53  Thus, for Sobrino, hope of the 
resurrection is, at least initially, “a partial hope” belonging particularly to all those 
ignored, abandoned and crucified in history.54  This hope can become universal 
only when those of us who are not “victims” in the particular sense of the poor and 
the oppressed or those of us whom Sobrino calls the “non-poor” share and 
“participate, analogously, in the life and death of victims.”55  In order for hope in 
the resurrection to become real and personal for us, we must first share in the 
crosses of our time in history.  Sobrino argues that these crosses are found in the 
lives and deaths of the innocent victims of the Third World.   
 In order to appreciate Sobrino’s claiming of the hope of the resurrection as 
primarily a hope for victims, it is first necessary to understand his view of the 
kingdom of God made visible and initiated by Jesus’ ministry.  Sobrino says that 
“liberation theology deliberately chooses the Kingdom of God and not the 
resurrection as ‘ultimate’” because it is the kingdom of God that has the power for 
showing us “how to live in history,”56 that is, it informs our praxis.  For Sobrino, 
hope only has meaning when it is grounded in a particular praxis.  The particular 
struggles and sufferings that we undergo to make our lives meaningful create the 
                                                 
51 Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, p. 79. 
52 Ibid., p. 233. 
53 Jon Sobrino, Christ the Liberator (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), p. 15. 
54 Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, p. 124. 
55 Sobrino, Christ the Liberator, p. 43. 
56 Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, p. 124. 
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context necessary for hope to make sense.  Thus, the praxis of the kingdom 
demonstrated by Jesus is the necessary context for the hope of the resurrection to 
make sense.  We can only share in the hope of the resurrection if we have reflected 
on Jesus’ particular mission and taken it up in our own lives.  This particular 
mission seeks out sinners (or those labeled as sinners by society), the poor, and the 
oppressed.  We will see that, for Sobrino, Christian hope refers primarily to a hope 
for liberation within history.   
Sobrino places particular emphasis on understanding the kingdom by “the 
way of the addressee” because if the kingdom of God is “good news,” then it is the 
audience of the kingdom who “will intrinsically clarify what is ‘good’ in the 
news.”57  Sobrino states that the addressee of the kingdom made manifest in Jesus 
is clearly the poor and the kingdom’s relationship to the poor “appears as a 
relationship as of right, based on the very nature of God.”58  Thus, God loves the 
poor and addresses the kingdom to them precisely because they are poor.  Sobrino, 
then, has the task of defining who Jesus understood as the poor when he addressed 
the kingdom of God to them specifically.  Sobrino distinguishes between two 
classes of poor described in the Synoptic gospels.59  First, there are “those who 
groan under some type of basic need” and they include the hungry, the thirsty, the 
naked, the mourning, and the imprisoned.60  They are those “weighed down by a 
real burden” and Sobrino calls these the “economic poor” because they are denied 
that which is “basic and primary in life.”61  Second, the poor are “those despised by 
the ruling society” and they include prostitutes, publicans, and sinners.62  They are 
those viewed as “the least” and Sobrino calls these the “sociologically poor” 
because they are denied the minimum of human dignity.63  Sobrino includes 
sinners in this category but by sinners here he refers to those whom the ruling 
society has labeled as sinners.    
These two classes of poor together make up “those at the bottom” of society; 
and for Sobrino “being at the bottom…means being oppressed by those on top.”64  
The kingdom is addressed especially to these poor, then, because they are 
oppressed.  Jesus showed “undoubted partiality” to both classes of poor.65   He 
demonstrated this partiality through his shared meals with publicans and sinners, 
which scandalized those at the center of society, ‘those on top’.66  His parables also 
                                                 
57 Ibid., p. 70. 
58 Ibid., p. 79-80. 
59 The Synoptic gospels include the gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke.  It excludes the Gospel of John.   





65 Ibid., p. 81. 
66 Ibid., p. 103-4. 
  13 
caused scandal because they proclaimed the partiality of the kingdom for the 
poor.67  Jesus’ healings and exorcisms are primarily “signs against oppression” 
because they give reason to hope that the “ultimate” oppressive power of evil can 
be undone and is, therefore, not ultimate.68  They demonstrate the kingdom 
addressed to those poor oppressed by evil.  Thus, in his meals, his telling of 
parables and his performing of healings and exorcisms, Jesus clearly and 
consistently makes visible the partiality of the kingdom for both classes of poor. 
 Sobrino goes on to examine Jesus’ concern for sinners.  Here, Sobrino 
distinguishes between two categories of sinners in the Synoptics, just as he did in 
his treatment of the poor.  First, there are those who are “oppressors” and they sin 
by “oppressing, placing intolerable burdens on others, [and] acting unjustly.”69  We 
could think of these sinners as those who sin from power.  This contrasts with 
Sobrino’s second category which is “those who sin from weakness.”70  He equates 
this group with “those ‘legally considered sinners’.”71  This second type of sinner 
seems closely associated with or almost equivalent to the sociologically poor 
described above.  Those who sin from weakness must be those who are denied the 
minimum of human dignity by being oppressed by those in power.  This linking of 
the sociologically poor, or those viewed as ‘the least’, with those legally 
considered sinners fits well with Sobrino’s claim that Jesus welcomed sinners more 
than forgave sins.72  In essence, Jesus gives back dignity to the least and those 
labeled as sinners by welcoming them into relationship.   
Sobrino states that Jesus offers salvation to both types of sinners, the 
oppressors and the oppressed, but he offers it to each differently.  For those who 
sin from power, the kingdom can only approach them if they put an end to their 
oppression.  For those who sin from weakness, inclusion in the coming kingdom 
simply requires an acceptance of God as love and therefore it approaches them 
much more easily.  Based on his distinction between types of sinners and degrees 
of sin, Sobrino implies that, although the kingdom is for all sinners, it is especially 
addressed to those who sin from weakness, those labeled as sinners, those who are 
victims of oppression.  By identifying the principle of liberation for this second 
group of sinners as Jesus’ welcoming initiative, Sobrino acknowledges the need for 
liberation from sin and shame, or from an “inner principle of enslavement.”73   
However, in spite of Sobrino’s affirmation of the need for liberation from sin 
and shame, he seems to imply that first priority goes to liberation from economic 
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and material poverty.  He sees Jesus’ pity in healing the sick and feeding the 
hungry crowds as an indication that Jesus saw something ultimate in material and 
bodily suffering and thus his pity for the economic poor and the physically 
unprotected was foremost and “not to be superseded by anything.”74  Jesus’ pity for 
sin and the sociologically poor, while still a priority, must then come second.  This 
emphasis on economic and social liberation over psychological liberation from sin 
and shame distinguishes Sobrino from Schillebeeckx.  Both assert that liberation 
must occur to some extent on both these levels and that resurrection hope includes 
a hope for liberation within history, yet, they make opposing claims about which 
form of liberation is primary.  Sobrino’s assertion of the priority of economic and 
material liberation tends toward an overlooking of Schillebeeckx’s claim that Jesus 
refused to look for a culprit.  By emphasizing economic and material oppression, 
Sobrino also highlights the economic and material oppressors and opens the door 
for labeling them as culprits.  
This increased potential for labeling culprits becomes clearer in Sobrino’s 
treatment of the kingdom’s relationship to the rich or those included under 
Sobrino’s label the ‘non-poor’. Sobrino points out Jesus’ frequent denunciations of 
the rich and calls it “an absolute denunciation…that nothing can soften.”75  Sobrino 
interprets Jesus’ analogy between the camel passing through the eye of a needle 
and the rich man entering the kingdom (Mk 10:25-27) as a demonstration that 
riches in and of themselves “ultimately mean damnation.”76  Thus, when the 
disciples ask who can be saved, Jesus replies that God can make possible what is 
impossible for mortals.  For Sobrino, this means that God will make it possible for 
the rich to denounce their riches and thus gain the hope of the kingdom.77  Sobrino 
gets more specific about what it means for the rich to denounce their riches when 
he says:  
 The solution has to be found in the line of lowering themselves to material 
poverty in  the form of…real service to and support of the materially poor, of 
sharing in and taking  on the fate of the poor…[and] in this to establish a real 
relationship with the materially  poor and with real poverty.78 
 
Thus, the non-poor can have hope in the kingdom only in so far as they lower 
themselves to share in the life of the poor.  To participate analogously in the hope 
of the kingdom a hope for victims, the rich must in some real and material way 
give up their riches and identify with victims of material and economic poverty.   
                                                 
74 Ibid., p. 90. 
75 Ibid., p. 171. 
76 Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, p. 171. 
77 Ibid., p. 172. 
78 Ibid. , p. 128. 
  15 
 Sobrino, then, maintains the universality of kingdom hope in spite of its 
partiality for the poor by way of analogy.  He argues that the universality of the 
kingdom is lost if it becomes a rejection of its partiality.  The poor and oppressed 
are the majority in the world and, therefore, a universality which fails to take them 
particularly and even partially into account is not very universal at all.79  In light of 
this understanding of the kingdom for the poor, the hope of the resurrection “is not 
the universal hope of an afterlife, but a partial hope – which can later be 
universalized – for the victims of this world.”80  The universalization of this hope 
comes through the analogous sharing in the lives of victims.  Sobrino argues that 
we cannot understand this hope as equally addressed to everyone by spiritualizing 
the poor so that all persons can be counted among them in some way because this 
spiritualization dilutes the essence of what the kingdom of God is.  He specifically 
renounces Walter Kasper’s understanding of the kingdom as the “Kingdom of 
Love” for this very reason.  As an “abstract-universal” it loses its sense of the true 
nature and specificity of the kingdom and “becomes practically interchangeable 
with other theological realities.”81   
 Sobrino’s understanding of Jesus’ death and resurrection is grounded in this 
partiality and specificity of the kingdom.  His explication of the significance of the 
cross is largely based on Moltmann’s theology of the “crucified God,” described 
above.  Sobrino summarizes this significance in terms of the “God of solidarity” 
when he says: 
 [I]n history there is no such thing as love without solidarity and there is no 
solidarity  without incarnation…Solidarity in a world of victims that was not 
prepared to become a  victim would in the end not be solidarity. 82 
 
Thus, Jesus’ death was the death of a victim in solidarity with all the victims in 
history.  Sobrino goes beyond Moltmann by claiming that Yahweh’s Suffering 
Servant is present in history as the victims or “crucified peoples” of the world.83  
We can take up the cross of Christ today by taking up the crosses of these victims.  
The hope of the resurrection is clarified by the life and death of Jesus as the life 
and death of a victim in history as well as by the lives and deaths of the countless 
victims today.  Sobrino adds one reflection regarding the resurrection as an 
indication of the kingdom’s partiality for he poor.  He notes the command in 
Mark’s gospel: “But go…to Galilee; there you will see him” (16:7).84  Because 
“Galilee is the place of the poor and the despised,” Sobrino suggests that this 
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command reflects Mark’s theological interpretation that the risen Christ is to be 
found among the economic and sociologically poor.85  For Sobrino, the cross and 
the resurrection continue the manifestation of the kingdom of God as a kingdom 
partially for the poor.   
Moltmann and Schillebeeckx both assert the fundamental universality of the 
kingdom in ways which lead to a broader interpretation of Christian hope than 
Sobrino’s understanding allows.  Moltmann begins his christology with the cross 
and claims that in Jesus’ death and resurrection God institutes a new kingdom 
which embraces the godless and the godforsaken, the lawless and the lawbreakers 
alike.  In Jesus’ abandonment on the cross, God freely allows the suffering of 
humanity, resulting from human freedom, to enter into himself.  The hope of the 
resurrection in light of Jesus’ death is a hope for all suffering humanity and all 
sinners without distinction.  Yet, Moltmann leaves room for victims to hope for 
God’s identification with them particularly without undermining the universality of 
Christian hope.  Schillebeeckx asserts this same universality based on Jesus’ 
demonstration of the kingdom throughout his life, in which he welcomed the poor, 
sinners and all the oppressed, while, at the same time, refusing to violate human 
freedom by labeling the oppressors as culprits.  Such a violation of human freedom 
in looking for a culprit would have undermined the kingdom of God.  Thus, for 
both Moltmann and Schillebeeckx, Christian hope is a universal hope right from 
the beginning.  It does not become universalized by analogy.  The kingdom’s 
particularity is made possible by this fundamental universality.   
Sobrino argues that the universality of kingdom hope can only come about 
through a recognition of its partiality for the poor: it is “a partial hope – which can 
later be universalized.”86  Sobrino’s assertion of the kingdom’s partiality 
undermines its fundamental universality.  If the non-poor share in the hope of the 
kingdom only by lowering themselves and participating analogously in the lives of 
victims, then universality appears to be analogous to the kingdom rather than 
intrinsic to it.   If all individuals cannot share in kingdom hope directly at some 
level then the universality of the kingdom seems to be an extrinsic possibility that 
we are trying to hold on to rather than a foundational reality.  Interpreting the 
particularity of the kingdom for the poor as a partiality fails to understand its 
particularity as necessarily grounded in its universality and, therefore, ultimately 
denies them both.   
Sobrino correctly asserts that “if the reality of Jesus’ resurrection is not 
made present in history in some form, then it will remain as something totally 
extrinsic to us.”87  However, by claiming that the resurrection is partially present in 
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the lives of the poor and the oppressed to the extent that the non-poor can only 
share in it analogously, Sobrino makes the resurrection largely extrinsic to many.  
The reality of the resurrection must be accessible to all individuals before it can 
have a particular significance to anyone.  Spiritualizing poverty and oppression 
does dilute the true force of Jesus’ life and message as Sobrino claims.  However, 
if one is not able to identify what is poor and oppressed within oneself because one 
cannot directly participate in the cross and resurrection, then one will never be free 
to share in the life of another.  Freedom from one’s own “inner principle of 
enslavement,” to use Sobrino’s language,88 is a necessary precondition for the 
freedom to live for others and this is true for the poor and non-poor alike.   
Thus, it seems to me that Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the necessary 
interdependence of the kingdom’s particularity and universality provides a healthy 
caution and corrective for Sobrino.  The hope of the kingdom and the hope of the 
resurrection is a human hope which God offers directly to all individuals in the 
person of Jesus.  Because it is a universal, human hope, God offers it particularly 
to those who are excluded, while at the same time refusing to label as culprits those 
who are doing the excluding and thereby excluding them.  Claiming the hope of 
the kingdom as a partial hope for victims does not allow for this interdependence 
because partiality and universality are inherently opposed.  If God offers this hope 
partially to victims, then some are initially excluded and are forced to seek 
reinclusion.  By asserting the link between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of 
human freedom, Schillebeeckx maintains that all persons must be free to share in 
this hope directly.  In revealing his power, not through force and coercion, but 
through defenselessness, vulnerability and love, God respects human freedom even 
to the point of death on the cross and he holds the doors of the kingdom open for 
all persons, even those oppressors who have victimized and crucified him.   
If Christian hope is a hope for integral salvation, i.e., a hope for both eternal 
life in the coming kingdom and for liberation from all forms of oppression within 
history, then it must be a hope which is fundamentally and directly accessible to all 
persons.  Because this hope necessarily includes a hope for liberation from 
economic and social oppression, the victims of the Third World have great reason 
to rejoice in claiming this hope as their own.  This particular claim on kingdom 
hope by the poor and the oppressed also has direct and legitimate implications for 
the lifestyles of the rich or non-poor in the First World.  However, hope for integral 
salvation also includes a hope for eternal life, i.e., the final, personal and unique 
validation of one’s personhood through lasting communion with a loving God in 
the fully realized kingdom.  This is the ultimate fulfillment of Christian hope.  
Therefore, the claiming of this hope by the economically and socially oppressed 
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cannot diminish its immediate accessibility to all persons, including the rich.  
Indeed, this would deny the very openness and inclusivity of the kingdom which 
Christ demonstrates through vulnerability and love.  The openness that Christ 
embodies in complete defenselessness on the cross reveals that Christian hope 
must be a hope which God offers uniquely, particularly and directly to each and 
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